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ZIVOTOFSKY V. KERRY: OF
PASSPORTS, POLITICS, AND
FOREIGN POLICY POWERS
CARA J. GRAND
INTRODUCTION
Curiously, throughout the entire history of the United States, our
government has managed to skirt the necessity to delineate the
boundaries between Presidential and Congressional powers in regard
1
to foreign affairs. An absence of explicit constitutional guidelines has
led to confused reliance upon conflicting extratextual sources,
2
ambiguous historical actions, and vague Supreme Court dicta. While
modern scholars seem to have a broad conception of the respective
foreign affairs powers that the President and Congress should enjoy,
the failure of the Constitution and the historical record to delineate
these powers expressly has created complex tensions between these
3
4
two branches. Interestingly, Zivotofsky v. Kerry, in seeking guidance
as to the treatment of a city on the other side of the world, brings to
light this very deficiency in our own constitutional law, and compels
an imminent determination regarding the division of our nation’s
foreign affairs powers.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
United States citizen Menachem Binyamin Zivotofsky
(Zivotofsky) was born in Jerusalem in 2002 to Ari Z. and Naomi
5
Siegman Zivotofsky, who are also United States citizens. The same
year, Zivotofsky’s mother applied for a United States passport for
 J.D. Candidate, Duke University School of Law 2016.
1. Saikrishna B. Prakash & Michael D. Ramsey, The Executive Power Over Foreign
Affairs, 111 YALE L.J. 231, 233 (2001).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Sec’y of State (Zivotofsky VI), 725 F.3d 197 (D.C. Cir.
2013), cert. granted 134 S. Ct. 1873 (Apr. 21, 2014) (No. 13-628).
5. Id. at 203.
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him, listing his birthplace as “Jerusalem, Israel.” The State
Department, in compliance with its policy set forth in 7 FAM 1383.5–
6, issued a passport in Zivotofsky’s name listing his birthplace as
7
merely “Jerusalem” and omitting any country designation.
On September 16, 2003, Zivotofsky’s parents brought suit on his
behalf against the Secretary of State, seeking, inter alia, declaratory
relief and a permanent injunction ordering the Secretary to issue
8
Zivotofsky a passport listing “Jerusalem, Israel” as his birthplace.
9
They cited section 214(d) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act,
which requires the Department of State to list the birthplace of a
10
person born in Jerusalem as “Jerusalem, Israel” upon request.
Since then, the litigation has been volleyed back and forth within
11
the federal court system. In 2004, the district court dismissed the case
on the grounds that Zivotofsky lacked Article III standing and that
12
the case concerned a nonjusticiable political question. In 2006, the
D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals reversed this decision, holding that
13
Zivotofsky did have standing to bring suit. The D.C. Circuit noted
that Zivotofsky had amended the injunctive relief he sought,
requesting that the Secretary record “Israel” rather than “Jerusalem,
14
Israel” as his birthplace on his passport. It remanded the case to the
district court so that a more complete record relating to the subjects
15
of dispute could be developed.
On September 19, 2007, the district court dismissed the suit again,
determining for the second time that it presented a nonjusticiable
16
political question. The D.C. Circuit affirmed, finding that “[b]ecause
the judiciary has no authority to order the executive branch to change
the nation’s foreign policy in this matter, this case is nonjusticiable

6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2003, Pub. L. No. 107-228, 116 Stat.
1350 (2003) (codified in scattered sections of 8, 22, and 50 U.S.C.A).
10. Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Sec’y of State (Zivotofsky I), No. 03-cv-1921, 2004 WL
5835212, at *1 (D.D.C. Sept. 7, 2004).
11. Zivotofsky VI, 725 F.3d at 203.
12. Id. (citing Zivotofsky I, No. 03-cv-1921, 2004 WL 5835212, at *4).
13. Id. (citing Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Sec’y of State (Zivotofsky II), 444 F.3d 614
(D.C. Cir. 2006)).
14. Id. (citing Zivotofsky II, 444 F.3d at 616).
15. Id. (citing Zivotofsky II, 444 F.3d at 619–20).
16. Id. (citing Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Sec’y of State (Zivotofsky III), 511 F. Supp.
2d 97 (D.D.C. 2007)).
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17

under the political question doctrine.”
The Supreme Court of the United States vacated and remanded
this decision, holding that the case does not present a political
18
question. The Supreme Court explained that the case did not ask the
federal courts “to supplant a foreign policy decision of the political
19
branches,” but rather, to enforce a specific statutory right. Because
the parties did not dispute the substance of section 214(d), the
Supreme Court stated that “the only real question for the courts is
whether the statute is constitutional,” which warrants a determination
of whether it impermissibly intrudes upon Presidential powers under
20
the Constitution. The Supreme Court instructed that “[r]esolution of
Zivotofsky’s claim demands careful examination of the textual,
structural, and historical evidence put forward by the parties
regarding the nature of the statute and of the passport and
21
recognition powers.”
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Jerusalem’s history has been a contentious saga of settlers,
22
colonists, and pilgrims of diverse origins. It has been home to Jews,
Arabs, and many others with passionate and ancient historical
23
claims. Fierce political controversy surrounding the city remains
alive in modern times, as both the state of Israel and the Palestinian
24
people claim sovereignty over Jerusalem. This political unrest gives
25
rise to the legal uncertainty at issue in this case.
Eleven minutes after Israel declared independence in 1948,
26
President Harry S. Truman recognized it as a foreign sovereign.
However, despite the United States’s eagerness to recognize the
country, Presidents from Truman forward have adopted a policy of

17. Id. at 203–04 (quoting Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Sec’y of State (Zivotofsky IV),
571 F.3d 1227, 1228 (D.C. Cir. 2009)).
18. Id. (citing Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Clinton (Zivotofsky V), 132 S. Ct. 1421
(2012)).
19. Id. (quoting Zivotofsky V, 132 S. Ct. at 1427).
20. Id. (quoting Zivotofsky V, 132 S. Ct. at 1427–28).
21. Id. (quoting Zivotofsky V, 132 S. Ct. at 1430).
22. SIMON SEBAG MONTEFIORE, JERUSALEM 532 (1st ed. 2012).
23. See id.
24. Zivotofsky VI, 725 F.3d at 200.
25. Id.
26. Robert J. Reinstein, Recognition: A Case Study on the Original Understanding of
Executive Power, 45 U. RICH. L. REV. 801, 804 (2011).
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27

strict neutrality regarding sovereignty over Jerusalem. The State
Department’s Foreign Affairs Manual (FAM) reflects this position of
28
neutrality, containing a detailed policy regarding the treatment of
29
Jerusalem. Among its many components, this FAM policy provides
that for an applicant born in Jerusalem, “[d]o not write Israel or
30
Jordan” on his passport, as Israel “[d]oes not include Jerusalem . . . .”
As such, the State Department is obligated to record “Jerusalem”
rather than “Jerusalem, Israel” or “Israel” as the place of birth on the
31
passports of applicants born in Jerusalem after 1948.
Over the last two decades, Congress has pushed back against the
executive policy of netrality, endeavoring to recognize Jerusalem as
32
falling within the sovereignty of Israel. In 1995, it enacted the
Jerusalem Embassy Act, which states that “Jerusalem should be
recognized as the capital of the State of Israel” and that “the United
33
States Embassy in Israel should be established in Jerusalem.” The
Department of Justice and the Secretary of State at the time
vehemently opposed this act, claiming the Act would impermissibly
intrude upon the President’s exclusive power to recognize foreign
nations and would severely impair the success of Arab-Israeli peace
34
negotiations. Congress ultimately enacted the legislation with a
waiver provision authorizing the President to suspend the funding
35
restriction for six-month periods in the interest of national security.
On September 30, 2002, President George W. Bush signed the
36
Foreign Relations Authorization Act. Section 214(d), the provision
at issue, provides:
(d) RECORD OF PLACE OF BIRTH AS ISRAEL FOR
PASSPORT PURPOSES. —For purposes of the registration of
birth, certification of nationality, or issuance of a passport of a
United States citizen born in the city of Jerusalem, the Secretary

27. Zivotofsky VI, 725 F.3d at 200.
28. Id. at 201.
29. Id. (citing U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, 7 FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANAUAL § 1383.6(a))
[hereinafter FAM].
30. Id. (citing 7 FAM 1383 Ex. 1383.1 pt. II).
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. (quoting Jerusalem Embassy Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-45, § 3(a)–(b), 109 Stat.
398, 399 (1995)).
34. Id. at 201–02 (citing 164 CONG. REC. S15, 463, 468 (daily ed. Oct. 23, 1995)).
35. Id. at 202 (citing Pub. L. No. 104-45, 109 Stat. at 400).
36. Id. (citing Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2003, Pub. L. No. 107-228,
116 Stat. 1350 (2003) (codified in scattered sections of 8, 22, and 50 U.S.C.A)).

GRAND 2.3.15 - FINAL READ VERSION (DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

2/5/2015 11:23 AM

OF PASSPORTS, POLITICS, AND FOREIGN POLICY POWERS

43

shall, upon the request of the citizen or the citizen’s legal guardian,
37
record the place of birth as Israel.

The President issued a signing statement with the Act, warning
that it contained provisions which impermissibly interfere with the
38
President’s constitutional powers regarding foreign affairs. It stated
that section 214(d) specifically, if construed as mandatory rather than
advisory, would interfere with the President’s constitutional authority
39
to decide the terms upon which to recognize foreign nations.
III. HOLDING
The D.C. Circuit first framed the case with Justice Jackson’s welladopted tripartite framework in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
40
Sawyer, under which the court evaluates the President’s powers to
41
act based upon the level of congressional acquiescence. The court
restated:
First, “[w]hen the President acts pursuant to an express or implied
authorization of Congress, his authority is at its maximum . . . .”
Second, “[w]hen the President acts in absence of either a
congressional grant or denial of authority, he can only rely upon
his own independent powers. . . .” Third, “[w]hen the President
takes measures incompatible with the expressed or implied will of
Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb, for then he can rely only
upon his own constitutional powers minus any constitutional
42
powers of Congress over the matter.”

The court noted that both parties agree that the present case falls
into the Youngstown framework’s third category, requiring a
determination of whether the recognition power, when at its “lowest
43
ebb,” authorizes the Secretary to decline to enforce section 214(d).
Following the Supreme Court’s instruction, the D.C. Circuit then
began the analysis of the separation of powers question with a careful
44
examination of the “textual, structural, and historical” evidence. It
acknowledged that “[n]either the text of the Constitution nor
37. Id. (quoting Foreign Relations Authorization Act, 116 Stat. at 1366).
38. Id. (quoting Statement on Signing the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal
Year 2003, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1698, 2002 WL 31161653, at *1–2 (Sept. 30, 2002)).
39. Id. (citing Statement on Signing the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, 2002 WL
31161653, at *1– 2).
40. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
41. Zivotofsky VI, 725 F.3d 197, 204 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
42. Id. at 204–05 (quoting Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635–37).
43. Id. at 205.
44. Id. at 205–06 (quoting Zivotofsky V, 132 S. Ct. 1421, 1430 (2012))
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originalist evidence provides much help in answering the question of
45
the scope of the President’s recognition power.” The court discussed
the ambiguities within the “receive ambassadors” clause of the
Constitution and Federalist No. 69, and suggested that the omission of
references to an exclusive presidential recognition power was likely
due to the founders’ greater concern with whether foreign nations
would recognize the United States than with how the United States
46
would recognize foreign nations.
The court then considered post-ratification history, which, the
court explained, supports the Secretary’s position that the President
47
holds the recognition power exclusively. It cited a number of
historical examples in which the President acted unilaterally or in
which the legislative branch deferred to the President on matters of
48
foreign recognition. In addition, the court considered Supreme
Court dicta in some cases in which the President’s stance on foreign
recognition was declared binding upon the judiciary, and other cases
indicating that the President could exercise the recognition power
49
without the consent of the Senate.
After concluding that the President holds the recognition power
exclusively, the court then considered whether section 214(d)
50
impermissibly intrudes upon that exclusive recognition power. It
stated that Congress does not have exclusive control over passport
matters, because the executive branch has retained the power to
intervene when issues of national security and foreign policy are
51
implicated. The President’s recognition power, it explained, “includes
the power to determine the policy which is to govern the question of
52
recognition,” and reiterated the Secretary’s arguments that section
214(d) “runs headlong into a carefully calibrated and longstanding
53
executive branch policy of neutrality toward Jerusalem.” The court
concluded by affirming the district court’s judgment dismissing the
complaint on the alternative ground that section 214(d) infringes
upon the President’s exclusive recognition power and is thus

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Id. at 206.
Id. at 206–07 (citations omitted).
Id. at 207.
Id. at 207–10 (citations omitted).
Id. at 211–13 (citations omitted).
Id. at 214.
Id. at 215 (citing Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 295 (1981)).
Id. at 216 (quoting United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 229 (1942)).
Id.
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54

unconstitutional.

IV. ARGUMENTS
A. Zivotofsky’s Arguments
Zivotofsky argues that section 214(d) is well within Congress’s
passport powers, and even if it were not, it does not intrude upon any
55
exclusive presidential powers.
1. Section 214(d) is Appropriate Passport Legislation
Zivotofsky argues that 214(d) is permissible passport legislation
56
falling well-within the confines of Congress’s passport powers.
Congress has dealt frequently with the subject of passports, and the
Supreme Court has looked to Congress’s legislation in resolving
passport issues even when they affect significant foreign policy
57
concerns.
Zivotofsky cites the fact that, in 1994, Congress directed the
Secretary of State to permit United States citizens born in Taiwan to
list “Taiwan” as their place of birth on their passports, despite the fact
58
that the United States did not recognize Taiwan as a foreign state.
The State Department responded by issuing a formal policy
declaration stating that its “one-China” policy had not changed
59
despite the new passport legislation. This, Zivotofsky asserts,
demonstrates that 214(d) may be implemented while maintaining the
60
executive branch’s recognition policy on Jerusalem.
Zivotofsky also notes that the Supreme Court has consistently
limited the President’s power over passport matters to the authority
61
62
conferred to him by statute. He cites Zemel v. Rusk, in which the
President was “statutorily authorized to refuse to validate passports
63
of United States citizens for travel to Cuba[,]” and Haig v. Agee, in
54. Id.
55. Brief for the Petitioner at 16–17, Zivotofsky v. Kerry, No. 13-628 (U.S. Jul. 15, 2014)
[hereinafter Brief for the Petitioner].
56. Id. at 19.
57. Id. at 20–21 (citations omitted).
58. Id. at 12, 21–22 (citing State Department Authorization Technical Corrections Act,
Pub. L. No. 103-415, 108 Stat. 4299 (1994)).
59. Id. at 13, 22 (citation omitted).
60. Id. at 22.
61. Id.
62. Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965).
63. Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280 (1981).
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which the Secretary of State could revoke the passport of a citizen
causing serious damage to United States foreign policy because “the
64
statute authorize[d] the action[.]” Zivotofsky emphasizes that such
precedents demonstrate that the President may not nullify Congress’s
directive in passport legislation merely by asserting a foreign policy
65
concern.
Furthermore, Zivotofsky asserts that even if foreign policy
concerns were sufficient to provide the executive with the authority to
interfere with Congress’s passport powers, the State Department’s
66
place-of-birth rules do not constitute a rational recognition policy.
The Foreign Affairs Manual permits “Taiwan,” “Gaza Strip,” “West
Bank,” and “Palestine” to be recorded as places of birth, despite the
fact that the United States has never recognized any of these regions
67
as foreign sovereigns. Therefore, the simple recording of a region as
a place of birth cannot be tantamount to a formal recognition of
68
sovereignty.
In addition, Zivotofsky highlights that Congress frequently
69
legislates in areas affecting foreign policy. For example, Congress
creates immigration legislation, which the Supreme Court has
recognized “can affect trade, investment, tourism, and diplomatic
70
relations for the entire Nation . . . .” In addition, Congress exercises its
constitutional powers to regulate foreign commerce and
71
appropriations. The executive has never disregarded or refused to
enforce any such legislation on the grounds that it interferes with the
72
conduct of the nation’s foreign policy.
2. Section 214(d) does not Infringe an Exclusive Presidential
Power
Zivotofsky argues that neither the Constitution nor postratification history support the existence of any exclusive presidential
73
recognition power. He explains that the original understanding of
64. Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 55, at 22–24 (quoting Zemel, 381 U.S. at 3; Haig,
453 U.S. at 289).
65. Id. at 24.
66. Id. at 25.
67. Id. (citations omitted).
68. Id.
69. Id. at 26.
70. Id. (quoting Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2498 (2012) (emphasis added)).
71. Id. at 27.
72. Id. at 26–27.
73. Id. at 27–28.
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the “receive ambassadors clause” in Article II, Section 3 of the
Constitution did not give the president exclusive authority to
74
recognize foreign sovereigns. Instead, Alexander Hamilton referred
to it in The Federalist No. 69 as “more of a matter of dignity than
75
authority[.]” Even if the “receive ambassadors clause” did vest an
implied recognition power in the President, it was certainly not
exclusive, because other means of recognizing foreign governments,
such as creating treaties or appointing ambassadors, require Senate
76
approval. In addition, Congress has exercised recognition power
77
under its war and foreign affairs authority.
Zivotofsky further claims that Chief Justice John Marshall’s
78
opinion for the Court in 1818’s United States v. Palmer, as well as
other Supreme Court decisions, have described a shared recognition
79
authority. In Palmer, a piracy prosecution, the Court held:
[W]hen civil war rages in a foreign nation, one part of which
separates itself from the old established government, and erects
itself into a distinct government, the courts of the union must view
such newly constituted government as it is viewed by the legislative
80
and executive departments of the government of the United States.

Additionally, the constitutional law treatises of William Rawle and
Joseph Story state that the legislature has superior recognition power,
and may declare its dissent from executive recognition or
acknowledge the sovereignty of another nation that the executive has
81
refused to acknowledge. Further yet, Zivotofsky asserts that postratification history does not support the existence of an exclusive
executive recognition power, and cites to a number of examples in
which recognition decisions were apparently made by Congress, or in
which the President implemented a recognition decision in
82
conjunction with Congress.

74. Id. at 28.
75. Id. (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 69 (Alexander Hamilton)).
76. Id. at 29.
77. Id. at 30.
78. United States v. Palmer, 16 U.S. 610 (1818).
79. Id. at 30.
80. Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 55, at 30–31 (quoting Palmer, 16 U.S. at 643
(emphasis added)).
81. Id. at 32–33 (citing WILLIAM RAWLE, A VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 96 (Philip H. Nicklin, 2d ed. 1829) and 3 JOSEPH STORY,
COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1560 (1833)).
82. Id. at 34, 57.
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3. Dicta in the Supreme Court’s Opinions does not Concern
Disagreement between Congress and the President
Zivotofsky also points out that, despite the D.C. Circuit’s emphasis
upon Supreme Court dicta in rendering its decision, no Supreme
Court case, in dicta or otherwise, has ever addressed whether
recognition power is exclusive to the President or shared with
83
Congress. In fact, the Supreme Court has never addressed the issue
presented by Zivotofsky’s case, in which the executive acts contrarily
84
to a Congressional enactment.
4. Enforcement of 214(d) Will Have Negligible Impact on
American Foreign Policy
Lastly, Zivotofsky asserts that because the enforcement of section
214(d) would have only a negligible impact upon foreign policy, there
are not strong enough grounds for the executive to override Congress
85
when the executive’s power is at its lowest ebb. He explains that,
with the exception of persons born in Jerusalem, the State
Department has applied the place-of-birth requirement flexibly to
accommodate the personal ideologies of passport holders in virtually
all instances, including in regard to Palestinian-American passport
86
holders. Section 214(d) would affect only a potential 50,000
Jerusalem-born Americans, and despite Palestinian perception, would
not actually have the effect of changing United States policy
87
regarding Jerusalem.
B. Secretary Kerry Arguments
Secretary of State John Kerry argues that the nation should speak
with one voice in deciding whether to recognize foreign nations, and
88
that this one voice belongs to the executive branch. He asserts that
this exclusive presidential recognition power is derived from the
89
Constitution. Furthermore, he contends that section 214(d)
constitutes an unconstitutional encroachment upon this exclusive

83. Id. at 58.
84. Id. at 59.
85. Id. at 63–64.
86. Id. at 63.
87. Id. at 63–64.
88. Brief for the Respondent at 9, Zivotofsky v. Kerry, No. 13-628 (U.S. Sep. 22, 2014)
[hereinafter Brief for the Respondent].
89. Id.
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90

presidential recognition power.

1. The Constitution Grants the President Exclusive Power to
Recognize Foreign States
The Secretary asserts that the primary source of the President’s
recognition power comes from Article II’s grant of authority to the
President alone to “receive Ambassadors and other public
91
Ministers.” He explains that this authority must include the power to
92
decide whether to establish diplomatic relations with a foreign entity.
Because establishing diplomatic relations with a foreign entity entails
treating the entity as a state, the recognition power is vested solely in
93
the President. He cites George Washington’s decision to receive
Edmond Genet, minister of the new government of France, which
Alexander Hamilton and Thomas Jefferson warned would constitute
94
an acknowledgement of the legitimacy of this government.
Kerry explains that the President’s recognition power is further
grounded in the Constitution’s assignment of the bulk of foreign
95
affairs powers to the President. He points out that, in a move away
from the Articles of Confederation’s assignment of foreign relations
solely to Congress, the Constitution designates the executive as “the
sole organ of the federal government in the field of international
96
relations.” It provides the President with the power to nominate
ambassadors and to make treaties, which constitute recognition
97
decisions.
Moreover, Kerry asserts that structural and functional
considerations confirm that the President’s recognition power is
98
exclusive. The Constitution, he claims, contains no provision for
99
Congress to make, or even participate in, recognition decisions.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Id. at 11.
Id. at 13 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3).
Id. at 13–14.
Id. at 14 (citing 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES § 1560, at 415–16 (1833)).
94. Id. (citations omitted).
95. Id. at 16.
96. Id. at 17–18 (quoting United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319–20
(1936)).
97. Id. at 18 (citing U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2).
98. Id. at 22.
99. Id. (citing 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES § 1560, at 417 (1833) (“The [C]onstitution has expressly invested the executive with
power to receive ambassadors, and other ministers. It has not expressly invested [C]ongress with
the power, either to repudiate or acknowledge them.”)).
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Because recognition decisions require careful judgments about
whether the state or government exists and controls a particular
territory, and how recognition would affect United States foreign
relations, the executive is far better positioned than Congress to make
100
such decisions. A shared arrangement would create friction between
the branches and uncertainty, preventing the nation from responding
101
to international events with clarity and decisiveness.
Kerry asserts that from the Washington administration to the
present, Presidents have made hundreds of recognition decisions
102
unilaterally. In addition, the Secretary contends that the President’s
recognition power has always been understood to include the
103
authority to determine the territorial boundaries of a foreign state.
These determinations, he explains, often have national security
104
implications. He claims that Congress has repeatedly acquiesced to
the President’s recognition power, citing, for example, the House’s
failed 1864 attempt to pass a resolution acknowledging the Emperor
of Mexico, and the Senate’s abandoned 1896 attempt to create a joint
105
resolution recognizing the independence of Cuba. Kerry asserts that
Zivotofsky’s attempts to demonstrate that Congress has exercised
recognition power are unavailing, because in each instance,
Congress’s actions were consistent with recognition determinations
106
already made by the President.
Kerry further contends that the Supreme Court and individual
Justices have repeatedly stated that the executive has sole authority to
107
make recognition decisions. In 1817, Chief Justice Marshall, sitting
as a Circuit Justice, declined to recognize Buenos Aires because the
108
executive had never recognized it. In 1838, Justice Story, also while
sitting as a Circuit Justice, wrote, “[i]t is very clear, that it belongs
exclusively to the executive department of our government to

100. Id. at 23 (citing Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 320 (the President “has his confidential
sources of information” and “his agents in the form of diplomatic, consular and other
officials.”)).
101. Id. at 25–26.
102. Id. at 27.
103. Id. at 29.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 31–33 (citations omitted).
106. Id. at 36.
107. Id. at 39.
108. Id. at 39–40 (quoting United States v. Hutchings, 26 F. Cas. 440, 442 (C.C.D. Va.
1817)).
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109

recognise, from time to time, any new governments.” Kerry cites a
number of Supreme Court precedents, which he states, reaffirm this
110
point. He explains that the reason that these precedents do not
specifically address a congressional attempt to constrain the
President’s recognition power is that Congress has historically
111
acquiesced to the President.
2.
Section 214(d) Unconstitutionally Interferes with the
President’s Exclusive Recognition Power
Kerry asserts that section 214(d) impermissibly requires the
executive, upon request by individual citizens, to treat Jerusalem as
within Israeli sovereignty in issuing United States passports, which are
112
official documents addressed to foreign sovereigns.
Because
passports constitute a form of diplomatic communication, the
executive has long used its inherent constitutional recognition
authority in regard to the content of passports to ensure that
birthplace designations conform to the President’s recognition
113
decisions.
The Secretary further asserts that Congress has historically
acknowledged the executive’s broad authority over the content and
114
use of passports. Congress has exercised its powers over foreign
commerce and border control by enacting statutes requiring passports
for certain travel, limiting particular persons’ travel, and prohibiting
115
application fraud and passport tampering. None of these statutes
purport to regulate passports’ content, much less content relating to
116
foreign relations matters.
Kerry argues that section 214(d) unconstitutionally encroaches
upon the President’s recognition authority by requiring him to
contradict his recognition position regarding Jerusalem in official
117
communications with foreign sovereigns. He explains that the
decision of how to describe place of birth necessarily operates as an
official statement of the United States’s recognition policy for that
109.
1838)).
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

Id. at 40 (quoting Williams v. Suffolk Ins. Co., 29 F. Cas. 1402, 1404 (C.C.D. Mass.
Id. (citations omitted).
Id.
Id. at 42.
Id.
Id. at 46.
Id. (citations omitted).
Id. at 47.
Id. at 48.
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particular area. Section 214(d), Kerry explains, would alter the
executive’s policy toward Jerusalem by forcing it to issue passports
119
acknowledging Israel’s sovereignty over Jerusalem. Finally, Kerry
argues that the D.C. Circuit’s decision was correct even in light of the
Youngstown framework, because despite the President’s diminished
power when acting contrarily to the will of Congress, Congress’s will
lacks legality here because it impermissibly intrudes upon the
120
President’s exclusive recognition power.
V. ANALYSIS
While the D.C. Circuit’s ultimate conclusion that section 214(d)
impermissibly encraoches on executive prerogative might have a basis
in constitutional intent, the opinion itself falls short of justifying such
an impactful ruling. The court quickly glazed over the issue of
whether section 214(d) constitutes an actual foreign recognition
policy decision, and in doing so, failed to properly consider a
significant threshold issue which seems taken for granted without
adequate support. In addition, the court relied upon erroneous
grounds for finding the existence of an exclusive executive
recognition power, taking into account the Secretary’s weak
arguments for a constitutional foundation and improperly relying
upon irrelevant dicta.
A. The D.C. Circuit did not State Sufficient Grounds to Determine
that a Place-of-Birth Passport Designation Constitutes an Official
Recognition Decision
The question of whether a foreign policy determination made by
Congress impermissibly encroaches upon a Presidential power need
not be reached if, in fact, section 214(d) is not making a foreign policy
determination. Indeed, neither the D.C. Circuit nor the Secretary of
State have articulated sufficient grounds for concluding that a
passport’s place of birth designation constitutes an official foreign
recognition decision which would have the effect of changing foreign
policy.

118. Id. at 49.
119. Id. at 52.
120. Id. at 58 (citing Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637–38
(1952)).
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As support for its determination that section 214(d) is a foreign
policy decision, the D.C. Circuit cited to both the title and legislative
121
history of section 214 in its entirety. However, as Zivotofsky
explains, the other subsections pertain to the location of the United
States embassy in Israel, a topic separate from that of passport
122
designations.
Supreme Court precedent indicates that the
constitutionality of one subsection of a statute should be determined
123
separately from that of the other provisions. In addition, Zivotofsky
notes that the Supreme Court’s ruling in National Federation of
124
establishes that Congress’s
Independent Business v. Sebelius
characterization of a law does not necessarily control its
125
constitutionality.
Moreover, the State Department itself does not definitively assert
that the provision at issue is a policy determination. For example, the
Secretary explained in interrogatories that 214(d) is unconstitutional
because the executive does not “engag[e] in official actions that would
recognize, or might be perceived as constituting recognition of,
126
Jerusalem . . . .” The fact that the provision merely “might be
perceived as constituting recognition” can hardly be tantamount to an
official foreign recognition decision that would have the force of
amending an executive foreign policy. As Zivotofsky notes, the State
Department’s rejection of the provision apparently rests upon the
concern that Palestinians may mistakenly interpret it as a dramatic
127
reversal of United States foreign policy. This concern in itself
necessarily includes the admission that the provision would not
actually constitute a reversal of foreign policy. The Secretary provides
no support for the contention that allaying fears about the

121. Zivotofsky VI, 725 F.3d 197, 217–18 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (citations omitted).
122. Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 55, at 19.
123. See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 508 (2010)
(“[W]e agree with the Government that the unconstitutional tenure provisions are severable
from the remainder of the statute.”); Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New England, 546
U.S. 320, 328–29 (2006) (“Generally speaking, when confronting a constitutional flaw in a
statute, we try to limit the solution to the problem. We prefer . . . to enjoin only the
unconstitutional applications . . . while leaving other applications in force.”).
124. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2593–94 (2012) (holding that,
despite Congress’s assertions that minimum coverage provision of the Affordable Care Act was
a “penalty” authorized under the Commerce Clause, the Court could find find congressional
authority under the taxing power instead because the Court’s “plain duty” is to adopt an
interpretation “which will save the Act”) (citation omitted)).
125. Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 55, at 20 (citing Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2593–94).
126. Zivotofsky VI, 725 F.3d at 200 (citation omitted).
127. Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 55, at 63 (citation omitted).
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amendment of a United States foreign policy is a necessary means of
maintaining the policy.
The Secretary also does little to reconcile its past treatment of
other disputed territories in regard to passports with its current
treatment of Jerusalem. Instead, he baldly asserts that the
Department’s policy prohibits “listing a country whose sovereignty
128
over the relevant territory the United States does not recognize.” As
Zivotofsky points out, the Foreign Affairs manual permits the listing
of such territories as “Taiwan” and “Palestine” as places of birth on
passports despite the fact that the United States has never recognized
129
these territories as foreign sovereigns. The Secretary attempts to
explain this away with the assertions that the Department allows a
“city or area” to be listed for disputed territories, and that listing
“Taiwan” is consistent with United States policy, which recognizes
130
Taiwan as a mere part of China. However, to some, Taiwan is a
country and a sovereign. Would not listing “Taiwan” as a place of birth
on a passport then essentially acknowledge a country’s sovereignity
over territory that the United States has never officially recognized?
Apparently the State Department did acknowledge this as a
concern, because it issued a foreign policy declaration accompanying
the Taiwan legislation stating that its policy toward Taiwan had not
131
changed. Why then, as Zivotofsky suggests, could the State
Department not comply with section 214(d), which, albeit for slightly
different political reasons, would also have the effect of listing a
country whose sovereignty over the territory the United States does
not recognize, while similarly issuing a foreign policy declaration
clarifying that the United States recognition policy toward Jerusalem
132
had not changed? It seems that such special treatment of Jerusalem
warrants stronger justification from the Secretary should he be
permitted to reject section 214(d).

128. Brief for the Respondent in Opposition at 22, Zivotofsky v. Kerry, No. 13-628 (U.S.
Feb. 21, 2014).
129. Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 55, at 25.
130. Brief for the Respondent, supra note 88, at 50–51.
131. See Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 55, at 13 (“State Department cable 299832, sent
on November 5, 1994 . . . added, ‘The U.S. recognizes the Government of the People’s Republic
of China as the sole legal government of China, and it acknowledges the Chinese position that
there is only one China and Taiwan is a part of China.’”).
132. Id. at 22.
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B. There is an Insufficient Basis for Concluding that Executive
Recognition Power is Exclusive
Even if the Supreme Court does find sufficient basis to conclude
that section 214(d) constitutes an amendment to United States
foreign recognition policy toward Jerusalem, there is currently a
dearth of evidence demonstrating that the executive has broad
exclusive authority to set foreign recognition policy, and as such, that
section 214(d) would violate separation of powers.
While Secretary Kerry never asserts that there is any explicit
foundation for an exclusive presidential recognition power in the
Constitution, he continues to argue that the “primary source” of this
133
power is the “receive ambassadors” clause of Article II. He explains
that because the President’s exclusive power to receive an
ambassador includes the power to decide whether to establish
diplomatic relations with that ambassador’s countries of origin, “the
134
recognition power is vested solely in the President.” This argument
is logically flawed, because it incorrectly assumes that receiving
ambassadors is the only means of recognizing a foreign nation. Kerry
himself seems to admit this later on in the same argument, when he
explains, “[s]imilarly, the President has the power to ‘make Treaties’
with the advice and consent of the Senate . . . in a manner that fully
135
accords with his recognition policy.” Here, the Secretary appears to
acknowledge another form of recognition decision, while
simultaneously admitting that the President cannot act unilaterally in
implementing it.
The Secretary’s principal remaining arguments for exclusive
executive recognition power are that Congress is not equipped to
136
handle recognition decisions, and that several Supreme Court
137
justices has spoken to this effect. These arguments are tenuous at
best. While the many historical examples he cites of early
133. Brief for the Respondent, supra note 88, at 13 (citation omitted).
134. Id. at 13–14 (emphasis added).
135. Id. at 19 (emphasis added).
136. Brief for the Respondent, supra note 88, at 22–23.
137. Respondent’s references to Supreme Court Justice’s decisions while sitting in Circuit
courts (Brief for the Respondent, supra note 88, at 39–40) carry little, if any, weight. See United
States v. Price, 50 U.S. 83, 92–93 (1850) (noting that although Justice Story’s decision while
sitting in Circuit court was “entitled to high respect[,]” it “is not binding in its authority upon
this court”). In addition, in Hutchings, the court concluded only that the judiciary could not
recognize the independence of a foreign nation. See United States v. Hutchings, 26 F. Cas. 440,
442 (C.C.D. Va. 1817) (observing that “it was not competent to the court” to pronounce the
independence of Buenos Aires, which the executive “had never recognized”).
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constitutional interpretations make a strong case that the President
138
does have some inherent foreign recognition power, they fail to
establish that this power is exclusive. In addition, by criticizing
Zivotofsky’s position because “the Constitution’s text prescribes no
role for the Congress in recognition decisions,” the Secretary places a
higher burden upon Zivotofsky than upon himself, because he does
not allege any explicit constitutional support for his argument either.
The D.C. Circuit, which ultimately sided with the Secretary, did
acknowledge that “[n]either the text of the Constitution nor
originalist evidence provides much help in answering the question of
139
the scope of the President’s recognition power.” However, it
adopted the Secretary’s interpretations of early post-ratification
historical examples, which do nothing to elucidate the full range of the
140
executive’s recognition power. As Professor Robert Reinstein has
noted, every post-ratification example the D.C. Circuit cited for an
exclusive recognition power either proved only that the executive has
some non-exclusive recognition power, or even that executive power
141
is subordinate to congressional recognition power. As such, if the
Supreme Court does declare an exclusive Presidential foreign
recognition power, it will need to draw upon stronger constitutional
grounds than the Secretary’s constitutional arguments provide.
In rendering its decision, the D.C. Circuit also relied heavily upon
Supreme Court dicta, explaining that “carefully considered language
of the Supreme Court, even if technically dictum, generally must be
142
treated as authoritative[.]” Despite admitting that the Supreme
Court has never held that the President holds exclusive recognition
143
authority, it claimed that Supreme Court has stated such in dicta.
However, the court’s reliance upon dicta was misplaced. As Judge
Tatel noted in his concurrence, neither party, nor any of the amici,
have been able to point to a time in our history when the President

138. See, e.g., Brief for the Respondent, supra note 88, at 20–21.
139. Zivotofsky VI, 725 F.3d 197, 206 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
140. See id. at 207–10 (“Beginning with the administration of our first President, George
Washington, the Executive has believed that it has the exclusive power to recognize foreign
nations”).
141. Recent Case, Constitutional Law—Separation of Powers—D.C. Circuit Holds That
Recognition of Foreign Governments Is an Exclusive Executive Power.— Zivotofsky v. Secretary
of State, 725 F.3d 197 (D.C. Cir. 2013), 127 HARV. L. REV. 2154, 2160 (2014) (citing Robert J.
Reinstein, Is the President’s Recognition Power Exclusive?, 86 TEMP. L. REV. 1 (2013)).
142. Zivotofsky VI, 725 F.3d at 212 (citation omitted).
143. Id.
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and Congress have clashed over an issue of recognition. As such,
none of the cases the court cited provided any insight as to the scope
of the President’s recognition authority within the third category of
145
the Youngstown framework.
In fact, of the six Supreme Court opinions that the D.C. Circuit
cited, five never stated, even in dicta, that the President’s recognition
power is exclusive and thus not subject to any contrary acts of
146
Congress. Five of the cases merely asserted the dominance of the
President’s recognition power over the judiciary, while another
explained only that the President could implement recognition
147
decisions in the absence of the Senate’s advice and consent. In using
this erroneously interpreted dicta as its primary basis for reaching the
conclusion that the President holds exclusive recognition authority,
the court skirted a necessary discussion regarding where the
separation of power actually lies between the executive and
148
legislative branches when it comes to foreign recognition decisions.
C. Likely Disposition
The Supreme Court’s repeated use of the Youngstown framework,
149
including in its recent Medellin v. Texas decision, strongly suggests
that it will apply the framework in this case. This means that it will
likely evaluate whether or not historical evidence supports an
exclusive presidential recognition authority strongly enough to
overcome Congress’s will when the President’s power is “at its lowest
150
ebb.” As the Secretary correctly notes, this likely can be done if
section 214(d) is found to constitute legislation beyond the outer
151
bounds of Congress’s constitutional authority. Whether the Supreme
Court will reach this holding is somewhat unclear in light of the
notable absence of precedent illuminating this particular tension
between the legislative and executive branches.

144. Id. at 222.
145. Constitutional Law, supra note 141, at 2159.
146. Id. at 2161 (citations omitted).
147. Id. at 2161–62 (citations omitted).
148. Id. at 2162.
149. Medellin v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1350 (2008) (“Justice Jackson’s familiar tripartite
scheme provides the accepted framework for evaluating executive action in this area.”).
150. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 638 (1952).
151. See Brief for the Respondent, supra note 88, at 58 (“Contrary to the amici House
Members’ argument . . . holding Section 214(d) unconstitutional would not suggest that
Congress’s proper exercise of its enumerated powers cannot touch on subjects that relate to
recognition.”).
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On the one hand, no Supreme Court dicta appear to strongly
support the concept of an exclusive presidential recognition power
beyond the reach of congressional intervention. The “sole organ”
dictum upon which the D.C. Circuit largely relied has been historically
152
misinterpreted. In making the original statement, evidence suggests
that Chief Justice Marshall was discussing only the President’s power
153
to execute a treaty absent congressional instruction. He never
claimed exclusive executive recognition power, but rather, supported
154
Congress’s ability to intervene in foreign policy matters. Moreover,
other Supreme Court dicta appear to contradict the theory of
exclusive executive recognition authority, stating “Congress and the
155
President share . . . [recognition] power.”
However, the Court may ultimately be persuaded by existing
scholarly arguments favoring a broad reading of the President’s
156
authority over matters concerning diplomacy. Such arguments
explain that the President enjoys a “residual” foreign affairs power
under Article II, Section 1’s grant of the “executive Power[,]”, and
that leading political writers of the founding era, including Locke,
Montesquieu, and Blackstone, expressed that the executive power
157
included broad foreign affairs powers. In addition, the explicit
allocations of some foreign affairs powers to other government
bodies, such as the power to declare war to Congress, may constitute
evidence of the outer bounds of the President’s foreign affairs
158
authority, which may otherwise be all-encompassing.
CONCLUSION
Zivotofsky presents a unique dilemma to the Supreme Court in
that it will force it to define, for the first time, the boundaries of
legislative and executive power in matters of foreign recognition.
Ambiguities in dicta and a stark absence of analogous historical
examples will prevent the Court from drawing upon the security of
well-established precedent and venerated pillars of constitutional

152. Constitutional Law, supra note 141, at 2160–61.
153. Id. at 2161.
154. Id.
155. See id. at 2162 (citations omitted); Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 55, at 59
(citations omitted).
156. See generally Saikrishna B. Prakash & Michael D. Ramsey, The Executive Power Over
Foreign Affairs, 111 YALE L.J. 231 (2001).
157. Id. at 234.
158. Id. at 235.
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interpretation. Instead, the Supreme Court will have to fulfill its
ultimate role in examining what relationship, if any, the Constitution
envisioned between these two branches in regard to foreign affairs,
and what historical practice has suggested the future should hold for
the implementation of so many crucial United States recognition
decisions.

